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LIBERALISM, PHILANTHROPY, AND PRAXIS:  
REALIGNING THE PHILANTHROPY OF THE 
REPUBLIC AND THE SOCIAL TEACHING  
OF THE CHURCH 
Rob Atkinson* 
 
You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your 
soul, and with all your mind.  This is the greatest and first commandment.  
And a second is like it; You shall love your neighbor as yourself.  On 
these two commandments hang all the law and the prophets. 
-Jesus1 
Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of justice which 
attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice which attends to 
men. 
-Plato2 
This Article seeks a common ground for theists of the Abrahamist 
religious faiths and agnostics in the Socratic philosophical tradition on the 
role that the liberal state should play in advancing the two coordinate aims 
of traditional philanthropy:  helping society’s least well off and advancing 
the highest forms of human excellence.  It focuses particularly on 
Abrahamists who are orthodox Catholics and Socratics who are left-
liberals, distinguishing their broad views on the liberal state’s proper 
philanthropic role from the far narrower views of libertarians and other 
right-liberals.  It concludes that adherents of Catholic Social Teaching and 
advocates of secular left-liberalism can conscientiously work together 
toward a far greater governmental role in advancing philanthropy than is 
currently reflected in the United States’s fiscal policy.  To do otherwise is to 
impose a most perverse tax on both our society’s most needy and its most 
generous.  That, one hopes, is not who we are. 
 
*  Greenspan Marder Professor of Law, Florida State University.  My thanks to Alexandra 
Akre (FSU Law 2016) for her invaluable research assistance.  This Article is part of a larger 
symposium entitled We Are What We Tax held at Fordham University School of Law.  For 
an overview of the symposium, see Mary Louise Fellows, Grace Heinecke & Linda Sugin, 
Foreword:  We Are What We Tax, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2413 (2016). 
 
 1. Matthew 22:37b-40 (New Rev. Standard Version, Catholic Ed.) (noting Jesus’s 
response to a lawyer, who asked which is the greatest commandment). 
 2. PLATO, EUTHYPHRO 81 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Heart’s Int’l Library Co. ed. 1914) 
(noting Euthyphro’s response to Socrates about the relation of piety to justice). 
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INTRODUCTION:  
ODD ONE OUT:  AYN RAND, 
THOMAS AQUINAS, OR JOHN STUART MILL? 
Forgive me for beginning with a subject that may seem a bit off topic, if 
not out of date:  Congressman Paul Ryan’s speech at Georgetown 
University during the 2012 presidential campaign.3  You will recall that 
Representative Ryan, then the Republican Party’s vice presidential 
nominee, tried to pass the wolf of Ayn Rand’s hand-me-down 
Nietzscheanism off in the sheep’s clothing of Catholic Social Doctrine.4  
But very good shepherds on the Georgetown faculty were on their guard; 
their joint letter politely—pastorally, it is fair to say—sent Representative 
Ryan back to remedial catechism class.5 
The letter itself made two very basic points:  Ayn Rand’s philosophy is 
insistently antireligious and egoistic; Catholic Social Doctrine is 
emphatically theistic and philanthropic.6  That letter was a fine—I dare say 
loving—corrective for those faculty defenders of the faith to deliver to a 
fellow Catholic; Representative Ryan, to his credit, seems to have taken the 
message very much to heart.7  That may, in the eyes of the Republican 
Right, make him unfit for his party’s presidential nomination;8 it may also, 
in the eyes of his Church, mark the saving of his soul. 
I quite agree that Rand’s brand of libertarian conservatism—and Ryan’s 
and many another—cannot be reconciled with Catholic Social Teaching.  
But what, you may well wonder, has my take on that episode got to do with 
my Article for this symposium?  The Georgetown faculty’s exchange with 
Representative Ryan, after all, was a dispute among Catholics in good 
standing over basic points of Catholic doctrine; this is supposed to be an 
article on philanthropy for a critical tax conference at Fordham University 
School of Law. 
 
 3. See Rep. Paul Ryan, Remarks at Georgetown University (Apr. 26, 2012), 
http://dailycaller.com/2012/04/26/full-text-of-paul-ryans-remarks-at-georgetown-university/ 
[http://perma.cc/95HP-M8TR]. 
 4. See id.; Letter from Georgetown Univ. to Rep. Paul Ryan (Apr. 24, 2012) 
[hereinafter Georgetown Letter], https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JRLM7Jh9Pnrxptaf 
WYENXdAmxnXd4gQJMYTu3H4TFHA/edit?pli=1 [https://perma.cc/ZP2X-TN3V]. 
 5. See Georgetown Letter, supra note 4; see also Laurie Goodstein, Georgetown 
Faculty Latest to Chide Ryan, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2012, 1:42 PM), http://thecaucus.blogs. 
nytimes.com/2012/04/24/georgetown-faculty-latest-to-chide-ryan/ [http://perma.cc/PT73-
WTDT]. 
 6. See Georgetown Letter, supra note 4. 
 7. See Jennifer Burns, Atlas Spurned, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes. 
com/2012/08/15/opinion/ayn-rand-wouldnt-approve-of-paul-ryan.html [http://perma.cc/T4W 
U-RP5S]. 
 8. Then again, maybe not. See Darrell Delamaide, Opinion, Republican Presidential 
Nominee Could Be the Guy Who Isn’t Running, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 6, 2016, 9:41 AM), 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/republican-presidential-nominee-could-be-the-guy-who-
isnt-running-2016-01-06 [http://perma.cc/P97P-5T3U]; David M. Herszenhorn & Carl 
Hulse, Desperate G.O.P. Appeals to Ryan on Speaker’s Job, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/10/us/politics/desperate-gop-appeals-to-ryan-on-speakers-
job.html (discussing the Republican Party’s plea with Ryan to run for Speaker of the House) 
[http://perma.cc/TJ5A-4946]. 
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What’s more—and maybe worse—I have to confess that I myself am not 
a Catholic in good standing, at least by current Catholic standards.  Worse 
than that, I share the dubious boast of Melville’s Ishmael:  “I was . . . born 
and bred in the bosom of the infallible Presbyterian Church.”9  Perhaps 
worst of all, I also must confess that the fate that many good Catholics fear 
for adherents to Protestantism in general has definitely befallen this 
Presbyterian in particular:  I have lapsed into deep agnosticism, if not full-
blown atheism, and the political counterpart of those apostasies, far-left 
liberalism.10  So why should someone of my beliefs, or doubts, enter a 
debate about Catholic Social Teaching in a forum about federal taxation? 
The connection between the Paul Ryan episode at Georgetown and this 
symposium at Fordham is the thesis of my Article:  my left-liberal politics, 
even my lapsed-Presbyterian theology, share a huge common ground with 
Catholic Social Teaching; that common ground is philanthropy, my 
assigned symposium topic.  Whether left-liberals and Catholics in good 
standing put aside their differences to defend together that common 
philanthropic ground will determine the outcome of the 2016 election and 
thus, at least in the middle run, the fate of our nation and the world. 
Representative Ryan was not, of course, just speaking to fellow Catholics 
at Georgetown, nor was he merely addressing there the finer points of 
Catholic theology.  He was trying to enlist good Catholics and other 
conscientious Christians and Jews in the crusade of far-right liberals to roll 
the philanthropic state of the New Deal coalition back into the Lochnerian, 
if not Dickensian, dystopia of Austrian economic models11 and Ayn Rand’s 
adolescent fantasy.12  The Georgetown faculty letter nicely showed that the 
nineteenth century night-watchman state is not the ideal political 
community of Catholic Social Teaching.13  I want to show, in this Article, 
that the ideal political community of Catholic Social Teaching is, by 
contrast, very much the philanthropic republic of a wide band of left-
liberalism. 
That philanthropic republic is not only entirely compatible with Catholic 
Social Teaching, but also grounded in the same sources.  Borrowing a page 
from another Catholic in good standing, Alasdair MacIntyre, I want to 
remind you that behind left-liberalism’s substantive philanthropic agenda 
lie both classical philosophy’s emphasis on social justice and the 
Abrahamist faith’s insistence on a redeeming love of all humankind.14  
 
 9. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY-DICK 85 (Charles Feidelson, Jr. ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co., 
Inc. 1964) (1851) (emphasis added). 
 10. See, e.g., J. BALMES, PROTESTANTISM AND CATHOLICITY COMPARED IN THEIR 
EFFECTS ON THE CIVILISATION OF EUROPE 35 (C.J. Hanford & R. Kershaw trans., 1849). 
 11. For a fuller elaboration of the Austrian economic model, see LUDWIG VON MISES, 
HUMAN ACTION:  A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS (3d ed. 1963). 
 12. See Ryan, supra note 3 (explaining how a return to “free-enterprise” policies is 
consistent with his Catholic values). 
 13. See Georgetown Letter, supra note 4. 
 14. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE:  A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 
(2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE]; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE 
JUSTICE?  WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE]. 
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Beyond that, I want to show that the common ground of left-liberalism and 
Catholic Social Teaching is a shared sense, not only of the proper scope of 
philanthropy, but also of the liberal state’s role in promoting philanthropy.  
Orthodox Catholics, every bit as much as left-liberals, believe that 
philanthropy is the work not only of private parties, alone and in private 
philanthropic organizations, but also of an activist state,15 a philanthropic 
republic.16 
In contrast to Ayn Rand’s egoism, then, the philanthropy of the classics 
and the scriptures offers a common ground for Orthodox Catholics and 
secular left-liberals.17  But that leaves the second problem the Georgetown 
letter found with Rand’s thought:  it is antireligious.18  Would this not 
preclude an alliance between Orthodox Catholics and any liberals, left or 
right, since liberalism is fundamentally nonreligious?  Emphatically not.  
Our analysis needs to show that liberalism, though necessarily nonreligious, 
is not necessarily antireligious.  Liberalism of all stripes, even the farthest 
right, is theoretically nontheistic, but liberalism of no stripe, including the 
farthest left, need be antitheistic, in either theory or practice.  As our own 
constitutional regime will remind us, a liberal state can be neutral toward 
religion without being hostile to it.19 
In showing why far-left liberalism shares far more philanthropic ground 
with Catholic Social Teaching than far-right liberalism, it will help to have 
paradigms for each position; Representative Ryan has given us two of the 
three we need:  Ayn Rand and St. Thomas Aquinas. 
Choosing Rand as the champion of Ryan’s far-right liberalism may not 
seem entirely fair.  After all, Representative Ryan did not specifically 
embrace her in his speech; what’s more, when the Georgetown letter 
pointed out that this anti-Madonna seemed the source of his policies, Ryan 
immediately distanced himself from her.20  But the overlap of his views and 
hers was obvious enough, and it took journalists very little time to find 
instances, in other contexts, where Ryan had undeniably embraced Rand’s 
views, particularly on the state’s role in economics.21  And her view of that 
 
 15. Georgetown Letter, supra note 4 (noting that the Catholic principle of 
“‘subsidiarity’ . . . demands that higher levels of government provide help . . . when 
communities and local governments face problems beyond their means [such as] economic 
crises, high unemployment, endemic poverty and hunger”). 
 16. See Rob Atkinson, The Future of Philanthropy:  Questioning Today’s Orthodoxies, 
Re-Affirming Yesterday’s Foundations, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 251, 263–65 (2013). 
 17. See infra Part II. 
 18. See Georgetown Letter, supra note 4 (“[Rand’s] call to selfishness and her 
antagonism toward religion are antithetical to the Gospel values of compassion and love.”). 
 19. See infra Part II.A.1.b. 
 20. Scott Keyes, After Previously Praising Her, Paul Ryan Now Disses Ayn Rand:  ‘I 
Reject Her Philosophy’, THINKPROGRESS (Apr. 26, 2012, 11:40 AM), http://thinkprogress. 
org/politics/2012/04/26/471730/paul-ryan-ayn-rand/ [https://perma.cc/FLD7-5D5S]. 
 21. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Galt, Gold and God, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/opinion/krugman-galt-gold-and-god.html?rref= 
collection%2Ftimestopic%2FRand%2C%20Ayn [http://perma.cc/2A4N-HX2N]; Jane 
Mayer, Ayn Rand Joins the Ticket, NEW YORKER (Aug. 11, 2012), http://www.newyorker. 
com/news/news-desk/ayn-rand-joins-the-ticket [https://perma.cc/YE7N-PP2M]. 
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role has wide, if sometimes similarly sub rosa, support among much of the 
political Right.22  Rand has, even now, a literal namesake in the present 
presidential field; she once had an acolyte as Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve.23 
And two deeper reasons, ironically related, point to Rand as champion of 
right-liberalism:  focusing on her lets us be scrupulously fair to far-right 
liberalism, even as we make a point fundamental to our own analysis.  To 
be fully fair to Representative Ryan, we can use Ayn Rand as a nice 
contrast to other right-liberal paragons who, unlike her, are neither egoist 
nor antireligious.24  And, having made that fair distinction, we can then use 
it to make a fundamental point:  much of right-liberalism rejects both of 
Rand’s problematic positions, egoism and antireligiousness, but nonetheless 
insists on a radically smaller state role in economics, and thus philanthropy, 
than the role espoused in Catholic Social Teaching.25 
For the champion of Catholic Social Teaching, of course, Ryan could not 
have chosen better than St. Thomas—although better, we need to see, for 
our purposes than for his.  He was apparently hoping to find common 
ground not only with the authors of the Georgetown letter on issues of 
Catholic Social Teaching, but also with orthodox Catholicism more 
generally.  As a standard bearer for Catholicism on both points, the 
particular and the general, St. Thomas is indeed ideal.  Pope Leo XIII 
acknowledged the foundation of Catholic Social Teaching and also helped 
make Thomas the measure of Catholic orthodoxy across the board.26  But, 
even as other commentators on Ryan’s speech have made clear, St. Thomas 
was a most peculiar choice for Representative Ryan, because St. Thomas’s 
teaching about the role of the state is deeply incompatible with both what 
Ryan practices and what he preaches.27 
 
 22. Adam Davidson, Prime Time for Paul Ryan’s Guru (the One Who’s Not Ayn Rand), 
N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Aug. 21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/26/magazine/prime-
time-for-paul-ryans-guru-the-one-thats-not-ayn-rand.html [http://perma.cc/G3G5-NBTW]. 
 23. See Harriet Rubin, Ayn Rand’s Literature of Capitalism, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/15/business/15atlas.html?rref=collection%2Ftimes 
topic%2FRand%2C%20Ayn [http://perma.cc/NX5D-GWQZ]. 
 24. For an earlier generation, the paradigm was, of course, William F. Buckley Jr., “a 
committed Catholic [who] resisted the libertarian impulse to undermine established authority 
and devolve into anarchy.” Geoffrey Kabaservice, William F. Buckley Jr.:  Right Man, Right 
Time, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/books/review/ 
buckley-william-f-buckley-jr-and-the-rise-of-american-conservatism-by-carl-t-bogus-book-
review.html (reviewing CARL T. BOGUS, BUCKLEY:  WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR. AND THE RISE 
OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM (2011)) [http://perma.cc/5N3L-R69A]. 
 25. See, e.g., WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY JR., GOD AND MAN AT YALE:  THE SUPERSTITIONS OF 
ACADEMIC FREEDOM (1986); Burns, supra note 7 (noting that Buckley was a critic of Rand). 
 26. See Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris:  Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on the Restoration 
of Christian Philosophy (Aug. 4, 1879), http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/ 
documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_04081879_aeterni-patris.pdf (“Among the Scholastic Doctors, the 
chief and master of all towers Thomas Aquinas . . . in a certain way seems to have inherited 
the intellect of all.”) [https://perma.cc/HXS9-38R8]. 
 27. See Ross Douthat, The End of a Catholic Moment, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/17/opinion/sunday/douthat-the-end-of-a-catholic-
moment.html (“[T]oday’s Republicans are more likely to channel Ayn Rand than Thomas 
Aquinas . . . .”) [http://perma.cc/6QJB-CHVU]; see also Georgetown Letter, supra note 4. 
2640 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
If St. Thomas is hardly helpful to Ryan and the Far Right, he is hugely 
helpful to the liberal Left.  He called Aristotle “the Philosopher” with a 
capital “P,” as did both his Jewish and his Islamic counterparts, Ibn Rushd 
(Averroes) and Moses ben Maimon (Maimonides).28  St. Thomas held, with 
Aristotle and against all moral egoists and political individualists, that 
humans are essentially and ideally social creatures.29  St. Thomas, most 
critically, was willing, on the one hand, to agree with Aristotle that reason 
alone can guide us in our relations with each other, both ethical and 
political,30 even as he insisted, on the other hand, that unaided human 
reason could not bring us to a saving knowledge of God.31 
Both those latter points, we shall see, mesh nicely with the ethics and 
politics of modern liberalism; they are, in fact, the very foundation of the 
common ground that left-liberalism shares with Catholic Social Teaching.  
As St. Thomas is the paradigm of Orthodox Catholicism, John Stuart Mill is 
the paradigm of modern liberalism.  We need to see that they undertook, 
and accomplished, profoundly significant and nicely complementary tasks.  
St. Thomas reconciled the philosophy of Athens with the Scriptures of 
Jerusalem; more particularly, he managed to underpin Christian theology 
with Aristotelean philosophy.32  St. Thomas was thus able to accept the 
worldly wisdom of the Greek philosophers, even if he was obliged to deny 
them a proper knowledge of God. 
Mill tried to effect an equally impressive accommodation, in rather the 
opposite direction:  to reconcile the ethics of the classical philosophers with 
the ethics of the Christian scriptures, while leaving aside the theology of 
both.33  In so doing, he made it possible for modern liberals to join forces 
with Orthodox Christians on the common ground of service to their fellow 
humans, despite any differences they might have on the proper relations 
between humans and God.  What is more, Mill’s position allows for a 
significant theological concession:  we secular liberals do not know your 
God, but you may very well be right about Him.  Followers of Mill can thus 
humbly take the place that St. Thomas assigned the classical philosophers, 
even as followers of St. Thomas can take the same respectful attitude 
toward liberals that St. Thomas took toward their common classical 
 
 28. See, e.g., 1 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Q. 21 art. 1, in 1 BASIC 
WRITINGS OF SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS 5, 223 (Anton C. Pegis ed., Hackett Publ’g Co. 1965) 
[hereinafter BASIC WRITINGS]; MOSES MAIMONIDES, GUIDE FOR THE PERPLEXED ch. LXXI 
(M. Friedlander ed., 1881); AVERROËS, THE BOOK OF THE DECISIVE TREATISE & EPISTLE 
DEDICATORY 73 (Charles E. Butterworth trans., Brigham Young Univ. Press 2001). 
 29. AQUINAS, supra note 28, Q. 96 art. 4, at 922. 
 30. 2 id. Q. 91 art. 4, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 752 (“Now if man were 
ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural ability, there would 
be no need for man to have any further direction, on the part of his reason, in addition to the 
natural law and humanly devised law which is derived from it.”). 
 31. 1 id. Q. 1 art. 1, in 1 BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 6 (“It was necessary for 
man’s salvation that there should be a doctrine revealed by God, besides the philosophical 
disciplines investigated by human reason.”). 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. 
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masters.  What is more, Thomists can recall, with humility of their own:  
there, but for the grace of God, go I.34 
Before turning to the case for that common ground, we must address an 
important objection to my choice of champions:  Mill is the (secular) patron 
saint of all liberals, Right as well as Left; more strongly, Mill himself is 
closer to modern right-liberals than to modern left-liberals.  Mill is, true 
enough, the darling of the right-most of liberals, F.A. Hayek and Ludwig 
von Mises.35  And they have an important point in their favor:  Mill is, 
indeed, deeply concerned about excessive state power.36  But this tends to 
make Mill not a bad choice for left-liberal champion but a good one, in the 
way that Nixon was just the right President to visit China.  Although Mill’s 
instinct is strongly in favor of individual freedom and initiative, wherever 
he sees that initiative falling short at the expense of what we will identify as 
philanthropy, he always comes ‘round to state assistance.37 
This takes us back, significantly, to Ayn Rand.  The argument that Mill is 
too broad, even too far right, to represent left-liberalism nicely 
complements my concession that Rand is too narrow to represent right-
liberalism.  Some right-liberals are, in their personal lives, both profoundly 
philanthropic and deeply religious.38  The only real common ground they 
share with Rand is reservation about big government.  But that is also 
ground they share with Mill.  Mill’s thought nicely shows a deep tension in 
liberalism between fear of too strong a state and knowledge that only a 
strong state can accomplish the full range of philanthropic goals.39  In 
showing that Mill, the paradigmatic liberal, like St. Thomas, the doctor of 
the Church, resolves that tension in favor of philanthropy, we are 
welcoming philanthropic Catholics like Paul Ryan back onto the common 
ground that the most legitimate liberalism and the most Orthodox 
Catholicism comfortably share.  Thus the common ground we find for left-
liberalism and Orthodox Catholicism is open to these right-liberals as well.  
Only Ayn Rand, with her insistent egoism and strident antireligion, need be 
the odd one out.40 
 
 34. 2 id. Q. 109 art. 5, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 986–87. 
 35. See, e.g., F.A. HAYEK, HAYEK ON MILL:  THE MILL-TAYLOR FRIENDSHIP AND 
RELATED WRITINGS (Sandra J. Peart ed., 2015); VON MISES, supra note 11, at 203, 496, 678. 
 36. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 34 (George Sher ed., Hackett Publ’g 1979) 
(1861). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Think, for example, of Governor Mitt Romney and his expensive philanthropic 
work. Floyd Norris et al., Inside the Romney Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012, 8:42 
AM), http://thecaucus.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/01/24/inside-the-romney-tax-returns/ (“For 
the Romneys, [m]uch of [t]heir [p]hilanthropy [w]as in [c]ash.”) [http://perma.cc/U2AM-
UBKL]. 
 39. See infra Part III (discussing the optimally philanthropic liberal state). 
 40. But what, one might well wonder, about those of us who consider ourselves “left” 
but not “liberal”?  This is, again, a symposium of critical scholars, and liberalism is, perhaps, 
the favorite object of critical scholarly critique.  Here I have both good news and bad.  The 
good news is that I, with the bulk of critical scholarship, think liberal democracy is a huge 
muddle. See generally LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 
(1996); ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, KNOWLEDGE AND POLITICS (1975); ROBERT PAUL 
WOLFE, THE POVERTY OF LIBERALISM (1968).  The bad news, I’m afraid, is that the problem 
2642 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 84 
Making the case for a philanthropic alliance between left-liberalism and 
Catholic Social Teaching will take three steps.  Part I, on liberalism, 
examines the spectrum of liberal political thought, identifying four distinct 
“shades,” from bluest to reddest, in terms of four distinct economic 
functions of the modern liberal state:  providing the infrastructure for 
capitalism, correcting failures in capitalist markets, redistributing wealth, 
and promoting “superior goods” like fine art and higher education.  It shows 
how we must look beyond the intrinsic values of both our liberal economy 
and our liberal polity if we are to embrace and implement the fullest range 
of state functions, as both left-liberalism and Catholic Social Teaching 
indeed do. 
Part II, on philanthropic ethics, locates the guidance we need in an ethics 
of philanthropy grounded in both the Western Classics and the Abrahamist 
Scriptures.  This ethic passes both tests that Ayn Rand’s ethic fails; it is 
deeply and doubly humanitarian.  It seeks to ensure that every child born on 
earth has not only all of life’s basic necessities, but also a reasonable chance 
to develop as fully as humanly possible—to go to a university as fine as 
Fordham, to prepare to become a Mill, maybe, or even an Aquinas.  And 
this ethic can accommodate both religiously respectful agnostics like Mill 
and morally rational theists like St. Thomas.  Part III, on philanthropic 
politics, maps that philanthropic ethic onto the range of liberal politics 
identified in Part I, showing why the shared philanthropy of left-liberals and 
Orthodox Catholics presses them, even as the Church has long taught, 
toward an actively philanthropic state. 
I.  “LIBERALISM”:  IDENTIFYING ONE INDIGENOUS GENUS 
AND ITS FOUR DISTINCT SPECIES 
“Liberalism” is, of course, a much-contested concept; we hardly need a 
critical tax conference to remind us of that.  What’s worse, those of us who 
identify ourselves as liberal face criticism not only on our left flank, from 
critical scholars41 like many of my conference colleagues, but also on our 
right flank, from various versions of conservatism, some of the most 
powerful of which are self-consciously Catholic, like our host institution.42  
Nor is even that the worst of it:  we self-described liberals are not only 
under external critiques, left and right; we also disagree among ourselves 
about both the architecture of our school and who belongs within its 
walls.43 
In proper critical fashion, this analysis of liberalism eschews any effort to 
find its “essence.”  On the other hand, it tries to avoid the opposite extreme, 
the insistence that liberalism is an onion with no coherent core, no ultimate 
 
lies not with the liberal half, as modern critics tend to think, but with the democratic half.  
Here again I find myself in the good company of both St. Thomas and Mill—not to mention 
Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. 
 41. See KALMAN, supra note 40; UNGER, supra note 40. 
 42. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 14; MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, supra note 
14. 
 43. Compare KALMAN, supra note 40, with UNGER, supra note 40. 
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“there” for us to peel down to.  It focuses instead on identifying those 
aspects of liberalism that are relevant to our current task:  understanding the 
place of philanthropy in our legal system, particularly our fiscal system.  As 
Aristotle reminds us, we must not expect more precision about any subject 
matter than that subject allows.44 
Without risking either logical extreme—seeking liberalism’s essence or 
denying its existence—we can do nicely enough for present purposes with 
two related moves.  In Part I.A, we find a basic “family resemblance”45 in 
the ways that three significant aspects of our current society—its economy, 
its polity, and its culture—are liberal.  Then, in Part I.B, we identify four 
specific kinds of liberalism at the boundary of our economy and our polity, 
four ranges along the full spectrum of government-economic relations, from 
the small government night-watchman state on the liberal Right to the big 
government welfare state on the liberal Left.  Finally, in Part I.C, we notice 
why neither our capitalist market economy nor our liberal democratic polity 
can give us the criteria we need to choose among these four kinds of 
liberalism and why the third sector, nonprofit and nongovernmental, can 
and does supply that deficiency. 
A.  The Indigenous Genus:  Liberalism in Our Three-Sector Society 
Students of our society’s philanthropy, borrowing from students of our 
society generally, identify three public sectors:  our economic sector, our 
political sector, and our civic or cultural sector.46  Figure 1 shows these 
three sectors as dimensions of a comprehensive social sphere.  Each of 
these sectors is “liberal” in ways that implicate the root concept of 
liberalism, Mill’s “liberty,” particularly the modern, negative liberty:  
freedom from governmental compulsion and constraint.47 
   
 
 44. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (H. Rackham trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1944) (c. 350 B.C.); 
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (W.D. Ross trans., Digireads.com 2005) (c. 350 B.C.). 
 45. See J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS 149 (1962). 
 46. Rob Atkinson, Re-Focusing on Philanthropy:  Revising and Re-Orienting the 
Standard Model, 4 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 1, 63–65 (2012). 
 47. See generally, e.g., PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM:  A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND 
GOVERNMENT (1997); Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 
118 (1969). 
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Figure 1:  Our Three-Sector Society 
 
 
Our capitalist market economy is “free” in multiple respects.  On the 
supply side, everyone is free to be a capitalist; capitalists generally are free 
to produce and sell whatever they care to and keep the net profits.  On the 
demand side, consumers generally are free to buy whatever they are willing 
and able to pay for.  So, too, is our liberal democratic polity free.  As a 
democracy, all our citizens are free to vote, for pretty nearly any person or 
policy they care to support; our citizens are free from government action 
that is irrational, invidiously discriminatory, or overly intrusive into basic 
individual “freedoms.”  And, in the admittedly more amorphous third 
sector, those individual freedoms include the right to participate in an 
almost limitless range of cultural activities, including individual and group 
acts and programs of philanthropy, as well as the right to adopt and 
implement a wide range of political theories, including variants of, and even 
alternatives to, economic and political liberalism.48 
Beyond this civics-class outline of our liberal society, of course, our 
freedoms within and among these three social sectors—economic, political, 
and cultural—frequently overlap and sometimes conflict.  As a first step in 
understanding the relationship between our culture’s philanthropy and our 
state’s liberalism, it is useful to begin with the range of possible 
relationships between our liberal state and our capitalist market economy. 
 
 48. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 939–40 (W.J. Ashley 
ed., 1909) (1848). 
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B.  The Species:  Four Political Liberalisms 
from Four State Economic Functions 
In mapping the boundary between our economy and our polity, it is 
important to note at the outset that, at least officially, it is our polity that 
draws the line.  In our society, our liberal democratic polity is superior to 
our capitalist market economy, at least as a matter of constitutional law.  
“We the People” could amend the Constitution to abolish private ownership 
of the means of production and establish some form of state socialism.  This 
is, of course, not going to happen. 
Short of that extreme, our liberal democratic state actually deals with our 
capitalist market economy in two basic ways:  on the one hand, it generally 
supports that economy; on the other hand, it sometimes supplants it.  Within 
each of those two approaches of the state to the market, we can identify two 
particular functions—one more intrusive and one less—for a total of four 
functions that all modern liberal states play (properly or not)49 with respect 
to market capitalism.  Think of these functions as the “Four R’s”:  the 
Ricardian, the Regulatory, the Redistributivist, and the Aretist.50 
1.  Two Market-Supporting Functions of the Liberal State 
The liberal state performs two basic functions in support of a capitalist 
market economy:  establishing its foundations and regulating its operation.  
These are, respectively, its Ricardian and Regulatory functions. 
a.  The Ricardian Function:  
Establishing and Sustaining the Market 
President Obama provoked outrage (real or pretended) when he said, 
“[Y]ou didn’t build that.”51  Whatever he meant by that, this much is clear, 
even to liberalism’s libertarian Right:  if a society is to have a capitalist 
market economy, its state must provide an essential institutional 
infrastructure.  Specifically, the state must provide capitalism with a legal 
system that recognizes and protects property rights, including, most 
basically, personal safety and bodily integrity.  Beyond that, the state must 
provide for voluntary exchanges of entitlements and for protections against 
unwanted interferences.52  Mill’s mentor, Jeremy Bentham, with typical 
piquancy, put it this way: 
 
 49. This part, then, is descriptive; Part III takes up the normative question about the four 
functions described here. 
 50. This section tightly summarizes Atkinson, supra note 46, at 14–28. 
 51. President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President at a Campaign Event in 
Roanoke, Virginia (July 13, 2012) (emphasis added), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2012/07/13/remarks-president-campaign-event-roanoke-virginia [http://perma.cc/ 
5Y9M-XZY9]. 
 52. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS:  PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT 
DOMAIN 3–4 (1985); Atkinson, supra note 46, at 7–8. 
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Property and law are born together, and die together.  Before laws were 
made there was no property; take away laws, and property ceases.53 
A quaint old English case, Keeble v. Hickeringill,54 nicely illustrates the 
point (particularly nicely for us law professors, in our increasingly 
aggressive competition for a diminishing pool of applicants) with the 
example of a private proprietary school: 
But suppose Mr. Hickeringill should lie in the way with his guns, and 
fright the boys from going to school, and their parents would not let them 
go thither; sure that schoolmaster might have an action for the loss of his 
scholars.55 
A capitalist market economy, then, requires a legal system with three 
substantive areas familiar to all first-year law students:  Property, Contracts, 
and Torts. 
b.  The Regulatory Function:  
Correcting Market Failures 
Once up and running, thanks to the state’s Ricardian function, a capitalist 
market economy faces a number of possible failures, measured by its own 
metric of economic efficiency and documented by economists themselves.  
Two of the more significant market failures, for our purposes, are 
information asymmetries and externalities.  Here again, education—indeed, 
legal education—nicely illustrates the essentials.  Law students want to buy 
an education that prepares them for the practice of law; unfortunately for 
them, they cannot adequately appreciate what that entails until they actually 
have what they want to buy.  On the other hand, unscrupulous suppliers—
we all know who they are—could exploit this situation by selling students 
an inferior product at an inappropriately high price.  To correct this classic 
information asymmetry, the liberal state could, and all fifty of our states 
more or less do, impose quality-control measures on legal education.56 
In the case of legal education, those quality-control measures may protect 
not only student consumers, but also the public at large.  Inadequately 
trained lawyers may well be a burden on the court system, requiring judges 
to correct their mistakes, thus delaying the cases of other litigants or 
requiring the public to pay for more judges.  These external costs—costs 
borne by parties outside the original sale of subpar legal education—
 
 53. Jeremy Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, in THEORY OF LEGISLATION 88, 113 
(R. Hildreth trans., 4th ed. 1882).  Mill, in his own work, mentions this function only to 
place its legitimacy above debate. MILL, supra note 48, at 799–801; see also Linda Sugin, 
Don’t Give Up on Taxes, 145 TAX NOTES 1373, 1375 (2014) (“The basic infrastructure of 
society benefits the wealthy compared to the poor,” in part because “[t]hat infrastructure 
includes the operation of markets and the monetary system.”). 
 54. 11 East 574, 103 Eng. Rep. 1127 (Queen’s Bench 1701). 
 55. Id. at 1128 (citing 11 Henry IV 47 (1490)). 
 56. See, e.g., ABA, 2015–2016 STANDARDS AND RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR APPROVAL OF 
LAW SCHOOLS (2016), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/misc/ 
legal_education/Standards/2015_2016_aba_standards_for_approval_of_law_schools_final.a
uthcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SLK-32PB]. 
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illustrate the second classic market failure that the liberal state may, and 
does, try to correct. 
2.  Market Supplanting 
The liberal state’s Ricardian and Regulatory functions work to make the 
market accomplish its own basic function:  providing consumers with the 
goods and services they are both willing and able to pay for.  The liberal 
state’s market-supplanting functions, by contrast, address perceived 
problems with those two basic conditions of all market exchanges:  ability 
to pay and willingness to pay. 
a.  The Redistributive Function 
All of my students, and surely many of Fordham’s, receive tuition 
subsidies.  This reflects an implicit societal decision—perhaps now under 
severe if not serious reconsideration—that we need more lawyers than we 
would have if the market, even after the correction of classic market 
failures, were left entirely on its own.  The GI Bill reflected a similar, and 
much wider, consensus about subsidizing higher education more 
generally.57  And, of course, the government engages in an even wider 
range of wealth redistribution, from poverty relief to, one might argue, Wall 
Street bailouts.58 
If the state were only interested in wealth redistribution, we need to note, 
it would make these transfers in cash.  As our education and poverty relief 
programs remind us, these transfers are often made either in kind—Jeb 
Bush’s “free stuff”59—or with significant “strings” attached.  For example, 
the bulk of student loans must go for education-related expenses; what once 
were called “Food Stamps” can be redeemed for food, but not for beer or 
cigarettes.  To understand these restrictions, we must look at the state’s 
fourth function, the Aretist. 
b.  The Aretist Function 
The Redistributive function gives consumers what they otherwise 
couldn’t buy; the Aretist function gives them what they otherwise wouldn’t 
buy.  If the state wanted only to increase consumer-buying power, it could 
simply reduce taxes; because it wants also to promote more enjoyment (and 
presumably more appreciation) of classic and experimental drama, painting, 
 
 57. See Serviceman’s Readjustment Act of 1944, Pub. L. No. 78-348, § 400, 58 Stat. 
284, 287; see also Eliza Berman, How the G.I. Bill Changed the Face of Higher Education 
in America, TIME (June 22, 2015), http://time.com/3915231/student-veterans [http://perma. 
cc/9S7Z-STGS]. 
 58. Bryce Covert, We All Get ‘Free Stuff’ from the Government, N.Y. TIMES (Oct 8. 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/opinion/we-all-get-free-stuff-from-the-govern 
ment.html?_r=0 [http://perma.cc/CJD9-KP55]. 
 59. See Charles M. Blow, Jeb Bush, ‘Free Stuff’ and Black Folks, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 
2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/28/opinion/charles-m-blow-jeb-bush-free-stuff-and 
-black-folks.html [http://perma.cc/T42D-NTUH]. 
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sculpture, natural history, archeology, and ethnography, it subsidizes the 
National Theater, the National Gallery, and the Smithsonian Institutions.  
So, too, one might say, of liberal arts education, even legal education.  At 
prices set by the market, too few undergraduates might major in classics or 
philosophy; so, too, too few law students might take courses in 
jurisprudence or, ironically enough, law and economics. 
3.  Four Political Liberalisms 
From our four functions of the liberal state, we can derive four 
corresponding kinds of liberalism.  Each form of liberalism accepts as 
appropriate one of the four functions of the state; this entails accepting all 
the less intrusive functions and rejecting all the more intrusive ones.  The 
four liberalisms thus range from least to most state intrusion into the 
economy, and thus, roughly speaking, from political “Right” to “Left.”  
Ricardian liberalism accepts only the state’s role in creating and sustaining 
markets;60 Regulatory liberalism accepts not only this fundamental role, but 
also the state’s market-correcting role;61 Redistributive liberalism accepts, 
in addition to the Ricardian and Regulatory roles, the state’s redistribution 
of wealth;62 Aretist liberalism, finally, accepts all four of the liberal state’s 
economic roles, including the most intrusive, choosing and supporting the 
production and consumption of “superior goods” like fine art and higher 
education.63  Figure 2 relates these four kinds of liberalism to the four 
economic functions of the liberal state. 
 
Figure 2:  Four Kinds of Liberalism 
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4.  The Third Sector’s Ideological Role 
Identifying these four forms of liberalism as a descriptive matter poses an 
obvious normative question:  Why accept one level of government 
involvement in the market economy and not another?  This question, in 
 
 60. See Atkinson, supra note 46, at 16–18. 
 61. See id. at 18–22. 
 62. See id. at 22–24. 
 63. See id. at 24–25. 
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turn, raises another, at a deeper level of analysis:  Where would we go to 
look for the answer to such a question? 
Assuming, arguendo, that our three-sector social model is, indeed, 
comprehensive, we have three principal places to look for such answers:  
the private for-profit sector, our capitalist market economy; the 
governmental sector, our liberal democratic polity; and the third sector, our 
voluntary, pluralist culture.  For reasons that I have elaborated elsewhere, 
trying to derive the proper boundary of the economic and political sectors 
from the basic principles of either of those two sectors itself is a fruitless, if 
perennially tempting, avenue of inquiry.64  What Linda Sugin says about 
the proper level of progressivity in the tax system is true of the entire range 
of the state’s market-supplanting functions:  “There’s no principle that 
dictates the right level[;] it is a moral choice.”65 
Nor are the ordinary operations of our economic or political systems 
likely to produce the guidance we need in making that choice.  Individual 
capitalist firms have little incentive to produce ideologies, because 
ideologies have all the hallmarks of public goods.  And liberal democratic 
politics are not likely to help us here, for parallel reasons.  Any ideology 
approved by democratic processes would run up against liberal limits on the 
state’s proper role in promoting just such global visions of the good.  Even 
if the majority adopted an ideology that the liberal state legitimately could 
promote, we would run into a deeper problem.  Unless we are willing to 
take majority decisions as the final word in these matters, we would need to 
test any democratically chosen ideology by a kind of meta-ideology, putting 
us right back where we started.  What we need, at bottom, is a standard for 
questioning mere aggregations of private preference, whether those be the 
preferences of consumers on the demand side of the economy or voters in 
the elections of our polity. 
That leaves, by easy elimination, the third sector:  our voluntary and 
pluralistic culture.  Susan Rose-Ackermann has nicely suggested why that 
sector is indeed singularly suited to meet that need:  it produces global 
normative systems, or ideologies.66  Rather than rehearse that argument 
here, it is enough to notice that our culture not only can produce such 
systems, but, of course, actually has.67  Here we find what Holmes found 
with respect to law and MacIntyre with respect to virtue:  an ounce of 
history is worth a pound of logic.68  This suggests, quite rightly, that, if our 
three-dimensional social model is to be helpful, we must add, in effect, a 
fourth dimension—history. 
 
 64. Id. at 32–40, 41–51; see also Sugin, supra note 53, at 1374. 
 65. Sugin, supra note 53, at 1374. 
 66. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Altruism, Nonprofits, and Economic Theory, 34 J. ECO. 
LIT. 701, 710–15 (1996). 
 67. See Atkinson, supra note 46, at 54. 
 68. See N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921) (“[A] page of history is worth a 
volume of logic.”); MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 14, at 1–5, 51–52. 
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II.  PHILANTHROPIC ETHICS:  
TOWARD A PROPER REGARD FOR ALL “OTHERS” 
Part I identified four liberalisms by looking at four possible relationships 
of our liberal democratic polity with our capitalist market economy.  We 
saw that, with respect to its market-supplanting functions, redistribution and 
aretism, liberalism is pressed to look outside the norms implicit in our 
economy and our polity, consumer satisfaction, and majority preference.  
An obvious source is our society’s third sector, the cultural sector.  That 
sector, we also saw, can supplement the other two sectors in two 
complementary ways.  It can provide comprehensive normative systems, 
and it can provide its own distinctive organizations, relatively independent 
of both the market and the state.  In addition to their distinctive product—
comprehensive normative systems—third-sector organizations offer an 
alternative means for supplying a wide range of goods and services also 
available from either or both of the other two sectors:  healthcare and 
education, for example. 
This part shows how these two aspects of the third sector offer us a way 
of answering the implicit challenge posed by the Georgetown letter:  how to 
find a form of left-liberalism that is consistent with Catholic Social 
Teaching.  Part II.A narrows our focus down from the full range of 
ideologies our cultural sector might offer to a single very vigorous and 
viable candidate, philanthropy, which is both the alternative to egoism 
implied in the Georgetown letter and the common ground of liberalism and 
Catholicism.  Philanthropy, like all “global” normative systems, has two 
identifiable aspects, classically called ethics and politics.  Part II.B outlines 
the ethics of philanthropy, identifying the fullest possible form:  promoting 
the fullest possible range of excellence in human beings.  The fullest form 
of philanthropy, we will see, is the ethic of making people all that they can 
be:  fully realized human beings.69  On this, we will find plenty of common 
ground for Mill’s school of secular philanthropy and St. Thomas’s school of 
rational religious philanthropy. 
A.  From Many Ideologies to the One We Need:  
The School of Philanthropy That Mill and St. Thomas Share 
The third Sector, we have seen, both can produce and has produced the 
very kind of comprehensive normative system that we need to evaluate our 
four kinds of liberalism, a guide in finding a liberalism compatible with 
Catholic Social Doctrine.  That ideology will need to give us both an ethical 
system for operating within our market economy and democratic polity and 
a political framework for choosing how that polity should interact with that 
economy.  The next step in finding that ideology is a radical narrowing of 
options.  From all the possible ideologies our cultural sector offers to a 
particular one that can be a common ground for liberalism and Catholicism, 
a house comfortable for both Mill and St. Thomas.  Here again, the 
 
 69. See infra Part II.B. 
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Georgetown letter is our guide.  In choosing the right ideology to help us, in 
turn, choose the right liberalism, we can usefully begin with what the 
Georgetown letter rightly took to be a wrong liberalism, Ayn Rand’s.70  The 
Georgetown letter nicely noted two problems with Rand’s “thinking” from 
a Catholic perspective:  it is egoist, and it is antireligious.71  We need to 
look first at the problem of her egoism, then at the problem of her 
antireligiousness. 
We are looking for an ideology that negates egoism; with the kind of 
logic that I think St. Thomas would appreciate, we can start by thinking in 
terms of egoism’s opposite.  Rather than an ideology that would have us 
focus only on ourselves, we need an ideology that considers every possible 
“other.”  That logic would still leave a very wide range; we can fairly 
narrow that range to the western tradition of philanthropy, for several 
related reasons.  First, philanthropy is this Article’s assigned topic in the 
symposium.  Second, philanthropy is the way we would have our society 
go, the basic direction of the praxis I believe you and I can share.  Third, 
and not unrelatedly, philanthropy is the only real option for political praxis 
within our current social situation.  Our political system is, of course, 
democratic as well as liberal; to move our state in the direction we would 
like, we must have the assent, or at least the acquiescence, of a majority of 
voters.  In that respect, the much-remarked “halo” of charity casts a glow 
we need to claim.  Finally, philanthropy is ground that Athens and 
Jerusalem share; it is the ideology of my two epigraphs, one from Jesus and 
the other from Plato.72 
B.  Philanthropic Ethics:  The Proper Regard for Others 
In outlining our philanthropic ethics here, as in outlining the range of our 
liberal politics in Part I, we eschew two extremes:  seeking any absolute 
“essence” and denying any possible existence.  Our task is neither to join 
those students of philanthropy who seek to define our subject in the 
abstract,73 nor to answer reductionist critics who insist that all human action 
is self-interested.74  It is, rather, to outline philanthropy as it has come to be 
incorporated into our own contemporary culture, with a particular eye to 
identifying it as a viable set of norms for our ethics and politics.  In 
sketching that outline, it is useful to follow the Philosopher, at least 
metaphorically, by looking at two related aspects of philanthropic ethics—
its form and its substance. 
 
 70. See Georgetown Letter, supra note 4. 
 71. Id.; see also supra note 18. 
 72. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text. 
 73. I am myself, I must confess, among the chief of these sinners, or supererogatators. 
See, e.g., Rob Atkinson, Altruism in Nonprofit Organizations, 31 B.C. L. REV. 501 (1990). 
 74. See id. at 527; see also Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools:  A Critique of the 
Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 326 (1970). 
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1.  Philanthropy’s “Form”:  Other-Regarding 
As opposed to Rand’s egoism, both Socrates and Jesus orient their ethic 
toward others.  Beyond that, as the epigraphs above remind us, both cover 
the traditional range of “others” in the Western philosophical and 
Abrahamist religious traditions:  other human beings and God.  The 
philanthropies of both Socrates and Jesus, to use a familiar metaphor, have 
not only a horizontal dimension, our duty to our fellow-folk, but also a 
vertical dimension, our duty to God.  These two dimensions, we should 
notice, nicely cover the Georgetown letter’s dual criticism of Rand’s 
ideology:  First, it is egoist—it has essentially no regard for other human 
beings.  Second, it is “antireligious”—it actively opposes any consideration 
for the divine.75  How, in contrast, do the philanthropies of Jesus and 
Socrates map out these two dimensions of human ethical duty? 
2.  Philanthropy’s “Substance”:  Promoting Human Excellence 
As to the content of philanthropy, Jesus, like his Jewish predecessors and 
Islamic followers, is clear on both points:  love your fellow human beings 
as you love yourself; love God as completely as possible.76  As the epigraph 
from Euthyphro suggests, the Socratic position on both sets of duties seems, 
at least at first glance, less straightforward.77  To show their compatibility, 
we need to see, first, that classical philosophy and Abrahamist religion 
share a broad consensus on how to serve our fellow humans.  We then take 
up what is often seen as a problem:  their respective treatments of 
humanity’s duty to God.  We begin with the horizontal aspect of 
philanthropic ethics, where the common ground is clearer. 
a.  Philanthropy’s Horizontal Orientation:  
Our Duties to Each Other 
The Anglo-American law of philanthropy always has had two basic foci:  
relieving human need and advancing human excellence.78  Our society’s 
near universal acknowledgement of these twin aims, if only by lip service, 
is nicely captured in two contemporary slogans:  Leave no child behind; A 
mind is a terrible thing to waste.  What’s more, in a strong, if not 
predominant, stream of both its Socratic and Abrahamist adherents, 
philanthropy’s minimum of meeting human need and its optimum of 
advancing human excellence inevitably flow together:  if you want your 
neighbors to reach their highest potential, you’d better not let them starve.  
Philanthropy’s minimum task, relieving our fellow folk’s distress, is not an 
end in itself, but a necessary precondition of philanthropy’s optimum, 
 
 75. See supra note 18. 
 76. See Mark 12:30–31. 
 77. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 78. I argue the point of this paragraph at much greater length in Atkinson, supra note 16, 
at 256–60.  If you find the argument here engaging but either over-dense or under-
persuasive, you might look there. 
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human excellence.  And, even as that minimum sustains the optimum, so, in 
turn, the optimum ensures the minimum.  The philanthropic optimum is to 
produce fully flourishing human beings; the highest aspiration of a fully 
flourishing human being is advancing a philanthropic society in which full 
human flourishing is a real possibility for everyone, everywhere. 
That is what, in a significant strand of Abrahamist faith and Socratic 
philosophy, our fundamental duty toward our fellow folk came to mean.  It 
is not, clearly enough, the view of either all secular leftists or all 
Abrahamist believers.  It places, quite obviously, a high premium on the 
intellect; it is, I suspect, neither the Christianity of Mother Theresa nor the 
liberalism of today’s Democratic Party.  But it is, undeniably, both the 
Christianity of St. Thomas and the liberalism of Mill.  St. Thomas was 
eloquent in elaborating the point; Mill, of course, could be quite blunt:  “It 
is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”79 
Mill makes clear enough, elsewhere, that the intellects he means to 
cultivate need not be so great as Socrates’s; more importantly, for our 
purposes, he also argues that the horizontal dimension of his ethics is 
thoroughly compatible with Christianity: 
In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the 
ethics of utility.  To do as you would be done by, and to love your 
neighbour as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian 
morality.80 
We must not claim too much for Mill here.  He has earlier assumed that his 
utilitarianism is Socrates’s ethic;81 here he seems to assume that Jesus’s 
Golden Rule is the highest expression of Abrahamist ethics.82  We need not 
assume that Mill is right in either assumption.  All we need to see is that 
Mill himself believed that the ethics of Socrates and the ethics of Jesus were 
perfectly compatible.  And we need to see why, on this broader and deeper 
point, he could have been right. 
That compatibility rests on two basic points.  First, the Abrahamist God 
is distinctly “humanistic”; He reveals Himself in the scriptures of Jews, 
Christians, and Muslims as having the good of human beings very much at 
heart.83  Second, at least some understandings of the Abrahamist God hold 
that what He sees as good for human beings is necessarily the same as what 
human reason sees as good for human beings, at least in “horizontal” 
matters.  But what, then, about philanthropy’s orientation to its other 
“other,” God? 
 
 79. MILL, supra note 36, at 10. 
 80. Id. at 17; see also RICHARD REEVES, JOHN STUART MILL:  VICTORIAN FIREBRAND 476 
(2007). 
 81. MILL, supra note 36, at 1. 
 82. See, e.g., Luke 6:31; Mark 12:31. 
 83. Atkinson, supra note 16, at 261–65. 
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b.  Philanthropy’s Vertical Orientation:  
Our Duties to God 
The last section showed how the Georgetown letter, in identifying the 
problem of Rand’s egoism, pointed us toward common philanthropic 
ground shared by many in both the Socratic and the Abrahamist traditions, 
including our liberal and Catholic standard bearers, Mill and Thomas.  This 
section seeks parallel guidance from the Georgetown letter toward an 
analogous common ground for both Abrahamists and Socratics with respect 
to the vertical aspect of philanthropic ethics:  humans’ duty to God.  As the 
Georgetown letter found the horizontal aspect of Rand’s ethics, egoism, 
antithetical to Catholicism, so it found its vertical aspect—“antireligion.” 
“Antireligion,” for our purposes, was a wonderfully well-chosen word.  
Just as we looked, in the last section, for an ethics that was not egoist, so we 
need to look in this section for an ethics that is not “antireligious.”  
Everything at this point in our analysis turns on what we infer from the 
double negative “not antireligious.”  The first thing to notice is that “not 
antireligious” does not imply “religious.”  The antireligion of Rand, like 
that of Nietzsche and Marx, does not merely deny the existence of God; it 
takes the further step of actively opposing any vertical orientation of 
humanity at all.84 
The negation of antireligion, understood as active opposition to any 
vertical element of human ethics, leaves open a wide range of nonreligious 
ethical positions.  Without being antireligious, one simply could be 
indifferent to religion, for any of a number of reasons.  One might be a 
principled atheist, intellectually convinced that there is no God, that His 
nonexistence can somehow be proved.  Or one could be an agnostic, the 
term Thomas Henry Huxley coined to distinguish atheists, understood to 
mean those who deny the existence of God, from those of his own position, 
which was, more modestly, simply to disclaim any knowledge of God for 
oneself.85 
Nor does disclaiming rational access to God necessarily deny all access.  
Kant famously proposed to destroy metaphysical theology in order to make 
way for faith.86  Rational arguments about God’s existence, he argued, 
produce an antinomy:  opposite results, here both theism and atheism, by 
valid arguments from valid premises.87  And, significantly, one might also 
 
 84. See AYN RAND, THE VOICE OF REASON:  ESSAYS IN OBJECTIVIST THOUGHT 3–4 
(Leonard Peikoff ed., 1990); see also FRIEDRICH NIETSCHZE, THE ANTI-CHRIST (Oscar Levy 
trans., Wilder Publ’ns 2008) (1888); Karl Marx, Introduction to a Contribution to the 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, in DEUTSCH-FRANZÖSISCHE JAHRBÜCHER (Andy 
Blunden & Matthew Carmody eds., 2009) (1844), https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/ 
works/1843/critique-hpr/intro.htm (“Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart 
of a heartless world, and the soul of soulless conditions.  It is the opium of the people.”) 
[http://perma.cc/V4SP-FFVC]. 
 85. Thomas H. Huxley, Agnosticism, in CHRISTIANITY AND AGNOSTICISM:  A 
CONTROVERSY 9–11 (Humboldt Publ’g Co. 1889). 
 86. IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON 117–19 (Paul Guyer & Allen W. Wood 
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 1998) (1781). 
 87. Id. 
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follow Kant, and others, in believing that, although God’s existence cannot 
be proved rationally, it can be known in other ways.  Thus, for example, 
William James maintained the incontrovertibility of the kind of direct 
encounter with God reported by mystics, both conventionally religious and 
otherwise.88  And, of course, the skeptical, if not cynical, Bertrand Russell 
famously observed, “We may have all come into existence five minutes ago, 
provided with ready-made memories.”89 
This last point, with its unmistakable odor of sarcasm, takes us back to 
the central, if implicit, insight of the Georgetown letter:  the problem with 
Rand’s philosophy is not that it is unreligious, or even that it is atheistic, but 
precisely that it is antireligious.90  Socrates famously was accused of both 
destroying old gods and inventing new ones, both of which charges he 
denied.91  In the long and wide stream of secular ethical thinking that 
followed him, a very strong current (quite possibly the main channel) has 
not been at pains to deny the existence of God—has not, that is to say, been 
antireligious.  Here we can find the “not antireligious” position, and it is 
Mill’s and many another philanthropists’.92  To underscore its distinction 
from the antireligiousness of Rand’s egoism and many forms of 
philanthropy, we reduce the double negative of “not antireligious 
philanthropy” into the positive “religiously respectful secular 
philanthropy.”  Though almost certainly an agnostic himself,93 Mill, to the 
considerable embarrassment of some of his admirers, could be quite 
respectful indeed: 
[I]t remains a possibility that Christ actually was what he supposed 
himself to be . . . a man charged with a special, express and unique 
commission from God to lead mankind to truth and virtue.94 
c.  Reconciling Socratic and Abrahamist Ethics 
We have seen that Mill and St. Thomas agree, at least in broad outline, 
on the twin goals of traditional philanthropy:  relieving distress and 
advancing excellence.95  We also have seen that Mill’s agnosticism does 
not necessarily put him at odds with St. Thomas’s theism.  We have not, 
admittedly, shown how the two are reducible to a single absolute truth; St. 
Thomas, we should note, believed that he had. 
St. Thomas offered a grand theory for unifying all aspects of his 
philanthropy, not only the two aspects of the horizontal, meeting basic 
 
 88. WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE 420–21 (Project 
Gutenberg 2014) (1917). 
 89. BERTRAND RUSSELL, RELIGION AND SCIENCE 70 (1997) (emphasis added). 
 90. See supra note 18. 
 91. See generally PLATO, APOLOGY (Benjamin Jowett trans., Harvard Classics 1914). 
 92. Given the distinct discount at which atheism has long traded in the West, it is hardly 
a surprise that few make, much less belabor, this point. 
 93. Reeves, supra note 80, at 471. 
 94. Id. at 476, 488 (quoting JOHN STUART MILL, THREE ESSAYS ON RELIGION:  NATURE, 
UTILITY OF RELIGION, THEISM 255 (Prometheus Books 1998) (1874)). 
 95. See supra Part II.A. 
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needs and promoting the highest excellence, but also linking that with the 
goal of philanthropy’s vertical dimension:  knowing God.96  As if that were 
not achievement enough, he also linked all of his philanthropic ethic up 
with a philanthropic politics, all neatly expressed in a single, profoundly 
pregnant, paragraph: 
All other human operations seem to be ordered to this [“contemplation of 
truth”] as to their end.  For perfect contemplation requires that the body 
should be disencumbered, and to this effect are directed all the products of 
art that are necessary for life.  Moreover, it requires freedom from the 
disturbance caused by the passions, which is achieved by means of the 
moral virtues and of prudence; and freedom from external disturbance, to 
which the whole governance of the civil life is directed.  So that, if we 
consider the matter rightly, we shall see that all human occupations 
appear to serve those who contemplate the truth.97 
Had there been in his time Nobel Prizes or Olympic Laurels for normative 
philosophy, St. Thomas surely would have won them both with this single 
paragraph and perhaps ended the event. 
In our time, alas, our aim, and thus our achievement, must be more 
modest.  It may not be possible, in principle, to reduce the two dimensions 
of philanthropy, horizontal and vertical, to one, at least for the two 
philanthropies relevant here, rationally moral theistic philanthropists and 
religiously respectfully secular philanthropists.  The former will have 
experienced God in ways not rationally refutable; the latter will not have 
encountered God in any meaningful way, rational or otherwise.  But, at a 
practical level, this problem tends to disappear.  If we focus on what we 
might call the intersection of our horizontal and vertical duties, we find a 
neat convergence in the teachings of both Socrates and Jesus. 
For Socrates, as our epigraph reminds us, justice has two parts:  one 
involves duties to human beings; the other, duties to God.98  The Euthyphro 
strongly implies these two theoretically distinct duties come down, in 
practice, to the same thing:  helping our fellow folk find the highest human 
good is the very sort of service that reasonable gods would want from us.99  
That approach neither requires nor precludes knowing a more direct form of 
contact with God.100 
In the Judea-Christian statement of the two halves of the law, we can 
detect a closely parallel convergence.  The second, human-oriented law, we 
are told, is like unto the first, God-oriented law.  Indeed, when Paul 
summarizes the whole law, he finds it necessary to mention only the human 
 
 96. 3 SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES ch. 37, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS, 
supra note 28, at 3, 59–60. 
 97. Id. at 60. 
 98. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 99. See PLATO, supra note 2, at 1–20. 
 100. Id. 
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side.101  Even more compelling is the lesson of a parable of Jesus himself:  
“Inasmuch as you have done it unto the least of these my brethren, you have 
done it unto me.”102  This rather strongly suggests that, from Jesus’s 
perspective, the philanthropically committed are his allies, if not quite his 
disciples, even if they know neither him nor his heavenly father. 
For Christians, theism alone is not sufficient for full human flourishing, 
nor is it necessary for meaningful contribution to the work of God among 
our fellow human beings.  Theism is not sufficient because, as the 
Scriptures themselves tell us, the very devils believe in God, and tremble.103  
Nor is belief in God necessary to serve God’s cause on earth; as Jesus 
himself teaches, those who minister to the least of his brethren are by that 
very fact serving him, even though they do not know it.104 
We have not proved that the two aspects of piety, serving God and 
serving our fellow folk, are one; we have not quite found a unified field 
theorem.  But we have shown that the two are compatible in the realm that 
we are interested in, that of helping our fellow folk here on earth.  And here 
St. Thomas makes the point we must build on:  if our fellow folk are to 
achieve the highest attainments humanly possible, all their basic needs will 
have to have been met.105 
d.  Summary 
We set out in this part to extrapolate from the two basic faults the 
Georgetown letter found in Ayn Rand’s ethics a positive position that could 
accommodate both Mill and St. Thomas.  We did that by unpacking two 
negative pregnants:  “not egoist” gave us “fully philanthropic”; “not 
antireligious” gave us “religiously respectful secular philanthropy.”  We 
have identified an alternative to Ayn Rand, philanthropy, and we have 
outlined a very full philanthropy, consistent with both Abrahamist faith, 
specifically Thomism, and with Western secular philosophy, exemplified 
by Mill.  In the next part, we can now make this Article’s central move:  
mapping an ethic of full philanthropy onto the possible forms of liberalism 
we identified in Part I.  We will see why both the school of Mill and the 
school of St. Thomas have good reason to unite in favor of a liberal state 
that is very strongly Redistributivist and Aretist. 
 
 101. Galatians 5:14 (King James ed.) (“For the whole law is fulfilled in one word, even 
in this; Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.”); see also Romans 13:9 (“The 
commandments . . . are summed up in this word, ‘Love your neighbor as yourself.’”). 
 102. Matthew 25:45. 
 103. James 2:19; see GARRY WILLS, THE FUTURE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH WITH POPE 
FRANCIS 133 (2015) (“Satan is smarter than men or women.  That does him little good 
without love.”). 
 104. See Matthew 5:5 (“Blessed are the meek, for they shall inherit the earth.”). 
 105. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 28, Q. 95 art. 1, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 783. 
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III.  PHILANTHROPIC POLITICS:  
TOWARD THE OPTIMALLY PHILANTHROPIC LIBERAL STATE 
Part II identified a fully philanthropic ethics as the common ground of 
Socratic philosophy and Abrahamist faith, or at least one subset of each 
suitable to our task, the liberalism of Mill and the Catholicism of St. 
Thomas.  This part examines how far that philanthropic ethics is compatible 
with the range of liberal politics we identified in Part I.  As Part I identified 
both one genus and four species of liberalism, so this part will need to 
“map” our fully philanthropic ethics onto liberalism in two distinct phases.  
First, we will compare the purposes of fully philanthropic ethics with the 
permitted purposes of generic liberalism, basically what our constitutional 
discourse calls “legitimate state interests.”106 
That will bring us to the second phase of our political analysis:  given 
that the liberal state can accommodate the full range of “horizontal” 
philanthropic goals, which of those goals should philanthropists seek to 
have our state advance?  This, we will see, often comes down to a critical 
institutional choice regarding whether our philanthropy is to be the work of 
private nonprofit organizations—such as the Church and its many affiliated 
charities—or the work of the liberal state and its agencies.  Once we see 
this, we can refocus on the basic question of how philanthropic we should, 
as philanthropists, want our liberal state to be. 
A.  Mapping the Overlap of the Full Range of Philanthropy 
and the Permitted Purposes of the Liberal State 
Comparing philanthropic purposes with the permitted purposes of the 
liberal state reveals two critical points.  First, the “vertical,” religious, 
aspect of philanthropy falls almost completely outside the proper functions 
of the liberal state.  Second, the “horizontal,” humanitarian, aspects of 
philanthropy all fall quite easily within the domain of the liberal state.  This 
section first considers the challenges posed by vertical philanthropy, then 
identifies the compatibility with respect to horizontal philanthropy. 
1.  “Vertical” Philanthropy and Liberal State Purposes 
In its politics, as in its ethics, the “vertical” dimension of philanthropy—
our duties to God—poses an obvious problem:  the religious neutrality of 
both liberal theory and our constitutional law.  But, even as we identified an 
accommodation between respectfully nonreligious secular philanthropy and 
rationally humanistic religious philanthropy, so here we can identify a 
parallel accommodation between rationally humanitarian religious 
philanthropy and the liberal state.  The twin foundations of both 
accommodations are essentially the same here as there.  First, the liberal 
 
 106. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 446 (1985) (noting 
that “to withstand equal protection review, legislation that distinguishes between the 
mentally retarded and others must be rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
purpose”). 
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state, like secular philanthropists of Mill’s school, can be nonreligious 
without being antireligious.  Second, the humanitarian projects of religious 
philanthropists can be grounded, like those of St. Thomas, in reasons 
accessible to the nonreligious. 
a.  The Respectfully Nonreligious Liberal State 
Our First Amendment nicely defines the dilemma any liberal state faces 
in dealing with religion.  On the one hand, as reflected in the Establishment 
Clause, the state must not favor religion too much.107  On the other hand, as 
reflected in the Free Exercise Clause, the state must not interfere with 
religion too much.108  The legal limits at either extreme are notoriously 
complex thickets of constitutional law.109  For our purposes, we need at this 
point to note an important path out of that thicket, between those extremes. 
Some forms of political liberalism, like some forms of philanthropic 
ethics, are decidedly antireligious.  The Jacobin phase of the French 
Revolution was virulently anticlerical (read mostly anti-Catholic);110 some 
aspects of modern French laicite may have the effect, even the purpose, of 
placing religion at a disadvantage.  But some forms of liberalism, including 
that embodied in our First Amendment, seem genuinely to try to keep the 
state neutral both among religions and between religion and nonreligion.  
Thus it should be possible for the liberal state and its various 
instrumentalities—including, most critically, its schools111—to point out 
the prospect of a “vertical” dimension to human excellence, without either 
offering its own vision of that dimension or recommending the vision that 
any of the organizations of the third sector themselves offer.  Again, the 
liberal state can be neutral toward religion without being hostile; that, 
indeed, seems to be the path that our Constitution requires.  It is also, quite 
significantly, a path that Catholic Social Teaching has come explicitly, even 
enthusiastically, to endorse.112 
 
 107. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
 108. Id. amend. I, cl. 2. 
 109. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Reynolds v. United States, 98 
U.S. 145 (1878). 
 110. See WILLS, supra note 103, at 128 (summarizing John Courtney Murray’s view:  “If 
Leo [XIII] condemned democracy, it was because the only form of it he knew was the 
anticlericalism of the French Revolution”). 
 111. See NEIL G. MCCLUSKEY, S.J., CATHOLIC EDUCATION IN AMERICA:  A DOCUMENTARY 
HISTORY, at vii (1964) (noting that the main theme of much Catholic writing on education in 
America has been “seeking viable alternatives to an educational system perceived as 
blatantly Protestant in the nineteenth century and dangerously secular in the twentieth”). 
 112. Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum:  Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII on Capital and Labor 
(May 15, 1891) [hereinafter Pope Leo XIII, Rerum Novarum], http://w2.vatican.va/ 
content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_15051891_rerum-novarum.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HM77-WXF9]; Pope Leo XIII, Longinqua:  Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII 
on Catholics in the United States (Jan. 6, 1895) [hereinafter Pope Leo XIII, Loginqua], 
http://w2.vatican.va/content/leo-xiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_l-xiii_enc_06011895_ 
longinqua.pdf [https://perma.cc/U6XJ-45AH]. 
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b.  The Rationally Humanitarian Abrahamist Faith 
Even as the liberal state can accommodate both secular and religious 
philanthropy at the constitutional level with a policy of principle neutrality, 
so it also can accommodate them at the level of ordinary politics with a 
principle of secular ends-means rationality.  Ordinary politics is the arena in 
which we are most interested, the arena in which we as philanthropists, 
secular and religious, advance or oppose particular philanthropic 
undertakings of the liberal state.  We will turn, shortly, to the guidance that 
Socratism and Abrahamism have to offer in that arena.  Here we need to 
note something fundamental about that arena itself. 
Our Constitution’s ban on the establishment of religion implies a positive 
requirement that our ordinary laws have a secular purpose.113  More 
generally, our Constitution’s implicitly republican foundation implies that, 
at a minimum, our ordinary laws serve a legitimate state interest by 
rationally related means.114  Even with this barest outline, we can already 
see the necessary common ground between the kind of liberal state that ours 
is and the kind of theism that Thomism is. 
To the great sorting question of theistic ethics—does God love the good 
because it is good, or is the good good because God loves it?—Thomism, 
like Socratism, opts for the former position, ethical rationalism, not the 
latter, ethical voluntarism.  For St. Thomas, as for Socrates, God is not only 
concerned for the welfare of human beings; His concern for human beings 
is rational as well.115  Whatever else that means, it means for St. Thomas 
that the good of human beings is accessible to ordinary human reason.  
Thus Aristotle could rationally seek it, and actually find it, without need for 
any special revelation, or even any special grace.  Because Thomism has, in 
this critical sense, a rationally religious ethic, all of its horizontal ethical 
positions are, at least in principle, capable of being adopted and promoted 
by the liberal state.  The Bible said it, I read it, that ends it, is as alien to St. 
Thomas as it would have been to Socrates, and for the same reason:  the 
horizontal ethics of both are ethics that rest on the giving of reasons 
intelligible in strictly human terms.116  As Garry Wills nicely puts it, “The 
Aristotelian-Thomistic politics was a matter of right reason, since it held 
that human’s highest gift is the intellect.”117 
 
 113. See Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 910 (1990) (noting that “[t]he purpose of 
almost any law can be traced back to . . . public health and safety, public peace and order, 
defense, revenue”); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1. 
 114. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985) (“The general 
rule is that legislation is presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classification 
drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
 115. See AQUINAS, supra note 28, Q. 45, at 433. 
 116. See 2 id. Q. 93 art. 3, in 2 BASIC WRITINGS, supra note 28, at 766 (“[A]ll laws, in so 
far as they partake of right reason, are derived from the eternal law.”); see also id. Q. 95 art. 
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2.  “Horizontal” Philanthropy and Liberal State Purposes 
The compatibility of philanthropy’s horizontal aspect with the legitimate 
purposes of the liberal state is illustrated nicely in the purposes listed in our 
Constitution’s preamble: 
to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic 
Tranquility, provide for the common defence, 
promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings 
of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.118 
The most obvious advancement of most horizontal philanthropic purposes 
would seem to lie in the liberal state’s Redistributivist and Aretist functions:  
relieving the worst degrees of human distress and advancing the highest 
kinds of human excellence.  It is important to notice, however, that the 
overlap covers the Ricardian and Regulatory functions as well.  The best 
evidence of this is the very ancient principle of English charity law that 
relieving the burdens of government is a legitimate charitable purpose.119 
The only real limit lies, as we have seen, at the other end:  the extent to 
which the liberal state can encourage a particular ideology, a 
comprehensive view of the human good.  This is, as we have seen, integral 
to philanthropic ethics, in both its Socratic and Abrahamist branches.  If 
liberalism must insist on strict neutrality here, it must leave off very much 
of the upper range of philanthropy; what’s more, the liberal state, 
particularly the schools of the liberal state, might have to become ethically 
neutral in a way that many philanthropists, both secular and religious, 
would find disquieting.120 
Here, as elsewhere, the thought of Mill is instructive.  On the one hand, 
as Mill quite rightly insists and our Free Speech Clause guarantees, the 
liberal state cannot suppress any ideology.121  But, on the other hand, that 
does not imply, either for Mill himself or for a significant school of other 
liberals, that the state has no Aretist role.  For Mill, indeed, that role can, 
and should, be quite expansive: 
 The uncultivated cannot be competent judges of cultivation.  Those 
who most need to be made wiser and better, usually desire it least, and, if 
they desired it, would be incapable of finding the way to it by their own 
lights.  It will continually happen, on the voluntary system, that, the end 
not being desired, the means will not be provided at all, or that, the 
persons requiring improvement having an imperfect or altogether 
erroneous conception of what they want, the supply called forth by the 
demand of the market will be anything but what is really required.  Now 
any well-intentioned and tolerably civilized government may think, 
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without presumption, that it does or ought to possess a degree of 
cultivation above the average of the community which it rules, and that it 
should therefore be capable of offering better education and better 
instruction to the people, than the greater number of them would 
spontaneously demand.  Education, therefore, is one of those things which 
it is admissible in principle that a government should provide for the 
people.  The case is one to which the reasons of the non-interference 
principle do not necessarily or universally extend.122 
We need not, in fact, go quite so far as Mill himself on this point.  Mill 
seemed to be quite comfortable with the state’s promoting his own 
particular utilitarian ethics,123 which, as we have seen, he equated with the 
ethics of both Socrates and Jesus.124  We need only note a possibility quite 
compatible with the eponymous value of liberalism:  the liberal state might 
well take upon itself the task of ensuring that every citizen has a reasonable 
opportunity to learn about, and choose among, the fullest vision of human 
excellence yet articulated.  The liberal state would not need to recommend 
the philanthropic way of Socrates and Jesus, Aristotle and St. Thomas; it 
would only need to give its citizens the freedom—both the absence of 
restraint and the presence of opportunity—to make that choice for 
themselves. 
3.  Summary 
This basic compatibility of philanthropy and the liberal state can hardly 
come as a surprise, because it is anything but a historical accident.  Liberal 
politics always has been, in both theory and practice, the quest for a state 
that can peacefully accommodate both the horizontal and the vertical 
dimensions of philanthropic ethics.  In starkest outline, this includes a state 
that must be neutral toward religion and that may advance any rationally 
based human good. 
B.  Assigning Philanthropic Tasks Among 
Our Society’s Three Sectors 
As soon as we see the range of overlap between philanthropic purposes 
and legitimate liberal state interests, we face an obvious question:  To 
which of our three social sectors should “we” assign the advancement of 
these purposes?  Before we address that question, we need to see how 
nicely the Standard Theory of Philanthropy poses that question, then 
threatens to beg it. 
 
 122. MILL, supra note 48, at 953–54. 
 123. MILL, supra note 36; see also W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 
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is not in question.”). 
 124. See generally MILL, supra note 94. 
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1.  The Standard Theory of Philanthropy:  
Descriptive Power and Normative Circularity 
The Standard Theory of Philanthropy offers a temptingly complete 
account of why each of our society’s three sectors—the economic, the 
political, and the cultural—performs distinct, if overlapping, functions.125  
According to this triple-failure theory, each sector picks up functions at 
which the others fail, or do less well.  We expect that private firms in our 
capitalist market economy will produce the goods and services we need, in 
the appropriate quantity and quality.  But, as we saw in outlining our four 
state functions, the market cannot do everything itself.126  Most basically, it 
cannot “bootstrap” itself into existence; the political sector, our liberal 
democratic polity, must provide the market’s basic legal infrastructure.  
And, as we also have seen, the market sometimes fails, in its own terms, to 
provide with optimum efficiency what consumers are both willing and able 
to pay for.127  Correcting these failures is the function of the regulatory 
state.  Beyond that, we sometimes question whether the efficient operation 
of the market is all that we, as a society, want.  Often we conclude it is not, 
and we invoke the state’s Redistributive and Aretist functions.  With the 
former, the state provides basics like healthcare and education to those who 
are unable to pay for them; with the latter, the state requires people pay for 
things we judge better than those they want, like a legal education that 
speaks of social justice, not just client satisfaction. 
That triple-failure account, of course, brings us back to our basic 
question:  How much of each function is the state to engage in, particularly 
the market-displacing functions that imply no intrinsic measures?  Here, the 
Standard Model neatly divides those market-supplanting functions between 
the political sector and the cultural sector.  The political sector provides just 
the kind and amount of market supplementation that the marginal voter 
demands, and the cultural sector provides what supra-majority voters are 
willing to provide on their own by privately patronizing or subsidizing 
third-sector organizations like parochial primary and secondary schools or 
Jesuit universities and their law schools.128 
We need to notice two key things about this twin-failure account.  First, 
as a descriptive account, it is a powerful account; second, as a normative 
matter, it is perfectly circular.129  Let’s consider, first, the Standard Model’s 
undeniable descriptive power.  The cultural sector can quite usefully be 
seen as meeting residual consumer and voter demand left unmet, for various 
reasons, by both the market and the state.  And the cultural sector’s 
constituents—nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations—have been neatly 
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studied for their comparative advantages over and against the other two 
sectors; we will soon turn to those insights ourselves. 
But the second aspect of the Standard Theory, its normative circularity, 
is, for our purposes, far the more important.  To say that the cultural sector 
provides a level of Redistribution and Aretism beyond what the marginal 
voter demands is not to say that what the marginal voter demands is the 
appropriate level of either.  The Standard Model, properly taken as a 
descriptive model, neatly poses that question—but, if mistaken for a 
normative guide, completely begs it.  We must, accordingly, answer that 
question by other means. 
2.  Toward an Aristotelean—and Thomistic and Millean—Mean 
To answer our basic question—how intrusive should philanthropists want 
our liberal state to be—we must look more closely at the reasons one might 
accept or reject the relevant state functions, from Ricardian to Aretist.  As a 
first step, it is useful to identify two extremes, or poles, each of which lies 
just off the liberal political spectrum defined by our four functions of the 
liberal state.  The reasons we must reject these extremes will help us to 
interpolate our position, as philanthropists, in the middle. 
a.  The Limiting Cases:  
Beyond Liberalism’s Farthest Right and Left 
Just beyond the minimalist, Ricardian state is, instructively enough, Ayn 
Rand’s antistatist politics.  At the other extreme, just beyond the liberal 
limits of the maximal Aretist state, is classical politics, the politics of 
Plato’s Republic130 and Aristotle’s Politics.131  If we code our liberal 
spectrum in the colors of traditional European politics, with blue on the 
right and red on the left, Rand’s position would be ultraviolet; Plato and 
Aristotle’s, infrared.  Each extreme, left and right, represents a logically 
complete union of ethics and politics, in identifiably opposite ways.  In both 
cases, the political position can be perfectly matched with, if not logically 
inferred from, the ethical position—the one fully egoist, the other fully 
philanthropic.  Once we appreciate those limiting cases, we will be able to 
appreciate the intermediate positions available to our paradigms, Mill and 
St. Thomas, and their contemporary followers. 
i.  Ayn Rand’s Extreme:  From the Ethics of Egoism 
to the Politics of Today’s “Republican” Party 
As a first step, Ayn Rand’s egoism is, once again, instructive.  Her egoist 
ethics implies an equally egoist politics:  if caring for others has no place in 
your ethics, it’s hard to see how it would have any place in your politics. 
Indeed, if willingly helping others is a bad idea, being forced by the state to 
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contribute to the helping of others would seem to be a doubly bad idea, a 
bad means to a bad end.  Randian egoism, then, would seem to map nicely 
onto the most minimal of liberal states, the Ricardian. 
But not quite.  Quite significantly, her capitalism is not really our 
capitalism.  Hers is capitalism for the capitalist;132 ours, capitalism for the 
consumer.  Our most right-wing economists have to be “trickle-down”; 
Rand’s position is, if you’ll forgive the pun, dam the trickle, keep all the 
gains, shall we say, at the capitalist “fountainhead.”133 
ii.  Socrates’s Extreme:  From the Ethics of Philanthropy 
to the Politics of Classical Republicanism 
In the Socratic tradition, ethics—the study of the good life for the 
individual—perfectly complements politics—the study of the good life for 
the community.  Justice in the microcosm of the individual is structurally 
the same as justice in the macrocosm of the community.  Just as individual 
justice entails the highest human faculty—reason—ruling wisely over the 
entire person, so too political justice entails the most rational of citizens 
ruling wisely over the entire community. 
Rand is off the liberal chart, as we have seen, on account of her 
economics; Plato and Aristotle, we now can see, are off on account of their 
politics.  Their politics is, most obviously, not democratic at all.  For at least 
some of its critics, that politics is not nearly liberal enough in the protection 
of individual rights.134 
b.  A Mean Between the Extremes:  
Mill and St. Thomas’s Common Ground 
No serious politician today can recommend the republic of Plato’s 
Republic; if that republic ever comes, it most likely will not be brought in 
by referendum.  But, of course, quite a few serious politicians flirt, if not 
entirely openly, with Rand’s literal antirepublic, a paradoxical political 
regime actively opposed to the very notion of the public good.135  As a 
practical matter, then, our analysis leaves us with two open questions.  On 
the one hand, why would philanthropists of either Mill or St. Thomas’s 
school ever recommend the minimalist state of an avowed egoist?  On the 
other hand, why would philanthropists of either school not always favor the 
most intrusive of Aretist states possible within liberal limits?  What, as a 
matter of principle, attracts some philanthropists of both schools to 
liberalism’s Far Right, and conversely, what repels them from liberalism’s 
Far Left? 
In sorting out the reasons those who embrace a fully philanthropic ethic 
might find for limiting the philanthropic role of the liberal state, it is useful 
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to borrow an old, admittedly imperfect, dichotomy:  a priori and a 
posteriori.136  Under the former head, we will consider limitations derived 
from ideological first principles; under the latter, limitations grounded in 
empirically contestable institutional advantages.  A priori limits on the 
philanthropic state rest on arguments that certain state functions, 
particularly the redistribution of wealth, would somehow be wrong, 
inherently.  A posteriori limitations, by contrast, rest on arguments that the 
liberal state’s efforts to perform those functions would somehow go wrong, 
inevitably. 
i.  A Priori Limits on the Philanthropic Liberal State 
The Georgetown letter helpfully reminded us that Ayn Rand’s antistatist 
ethics is incompatible with Catholic Social Teaching because it is egoistic, 
not philanthropic.  We now need to see that a significant range of antistatist 
politics at the libertarian right of the liberal spectrum are equally 
incompatible with Catholic Social Teaching because they rest on premises 
about the very nature of human beings and the state that the Church has 
explicitly rejected.  In its economics, the Church has consistently 
maintained that the profits of capitalist enterprise are not, a priori, immune 
from the state’s Redistributivist and Aretist obligations.137  This is because, 
in its politics, the Church, with St. Thomas, embraces the classical view that 
human beings are fundamentally “political animals,”138 over against the 
Lockean view that the state is a contractual arrangement concerned 
primarily with the preservation of individual rights.139  The Church thus 
implicitly places the third member of the original liberal trinity—
fraternity—on at least equal footing with the libertarian favorites—liberty 
and equality.140 
This theoretical difference has important practical consequences.  Those 
philanthropists, whether secular or religious, who find that their 
philanthropic ethics conflict with their Lockean view of the limits of the 
liberal state’s proper functions face a dilemma:  either sacrifice their night-
watchman state or sacrifice the achievement of their philanthropic goals.  
This, one suspects, is the real dilemma that the Georgetown letter posed to 
Representative Ryan.  The important thing for us to notice is that this is not 
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a choice between the Church’s position on politics—the proper role of the 
state—and the Church’s position on horizontal ethics—the proper care of 
our fellow folk.  It is, rather, a choice between a particular version of 
secular politics, explicitly rejected by the Church,141 and the Church’s own 
political teaching, which warmly embraces the full range of the liberal 
state’s four identifiable functions.142 
This latter dilemma, like all dilemmas, implicitly offers a way out:  try to 
cut off one of its horns.  That is the move that many Ricardian liberals—
opponents of any state function beyond the strictly night watchman—more 
or less explicitly make.  In essence, their argument runs like this:  never 
mind, then, whether the liberal state should, in principle, operate beyond its 
Ricardian function in the name of philanthropy; notice, instead, that, 
whenever the liberal state actually does undertake those other functions—
the Regulatory, the Redistributive, the Aretist—it always fails in terms of 
the very philanthropic goals it is supposed to be serving.  In making this 
move, Ricardian liberals shift, more or less subtly, from a priori to a 
posteriori attacks on the more expansively philanthropic state. 
ii.  A Posteriori Limits on the Philanthropic Liberal State 
Given that our exemplars, St. Thomas and Mill, are both rational 
philanthropists—and given that our liberal state concerns itself with the 
effectiveness of means as well as the legitimacy of ends—we must take 
these a posteriori critiques seriously.  When we do, we see that they offer 
not a dispositive argument against state philanthropy, but a set of risks and 
benefits—more precisely, institutional strengths and weaknesses—that we 
must weigh in choosing between identifiable elements of state and private 
philanthropy. 
 
The Basic Choices 
Our society’s capitalist market economy, as we have seen, cannot provide 
either wealth redistribution or aretism precisely because neither is likely to 
produce much profit, the necessary engine of capitalist production.  Our 
society’s other two sectors, our liberal democratic polity and our voluntary 
and pluralist culture, are likely candidates for performing just those 
philanthropic functions precisely because both of them are nonprofit.  Even 
as their being nonprofit distinguishes them from our economic sector, so 
another factor distinguishes them from each other.  Our cultural sector is 
voluntary; our polity is not.  On this distinction—voluntary versus not 
voluntary—turn virtually all the asserted reasons for choosing between the 
state and the cultural sector as the proper vehicles for philanthropy. 
To see why this is so, we need to notice just how the liberal state is 
nonvoluntary.  First, like all states, the liberal state has a social monopoly 
on the legitimate use of force; in our society, as in all modern societies, 
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only the state can operate coercively, and, in that critical sense, by 
nonvoluntary means.  Second, because ours is a liberal state, it must act 
under a basic constraint:  it can exercise its coercive powers only to advance 
legitimate ends by rationally related means.143  The liberal state is a 
government of laws, if merely human laws—not will, even divine will—
alone. 
Our state, like all states, may act coercively; our state, because it is 
liberal, may not act irrationally.  These two aspects of the liberal state, in 
turn, bear critically on how the two basic philanthropic tasks should be 
allocated between the state and voluntary nonprofit organizations.  The first 
of these philanthropic tasks is finance, providing the funds for philanthropic 
goods and services.  The second is delivery, the actual producing and 
distributing of those goods and services.  Figure 3 charts the four possible 
assignments of these two tasks, finance and delivery, between the two 
relevant sectors, the political and the cultural.  In making assignments, 
philanthropists face two distinct questions:  which sector should finance 
philanthropy and which should deliver it. 
 
Figure 3:  Four Options for Allocating Philanthropic Tasks 
 
Delivery 
Fi
na
nc
e 
 
State Agency 
Nongovernmental, 
Nonprofit 
Organizations 
State, by 
Taxes 
1.  State agencies, state 
funded 
 
E.g., public schools 
2.  Nongovernmental, 
nonprofit 
organizations, state 
funded 
 
E.g., “charity” 
hospitals
Private, by 
Gifts 
3.  State agencies, privately 
funded 
 
E.g.,  state universities on 
“U.Va. Plan,” state founded, 
privately funded
4.  Nongovernmental, 
nonprofit 
organizations, 
privately funded 
 
E.g.,  Catholic schools 
 
The traditional arguments for relying on private rather than state 
philanthropy tend to pose a false dilemma at each decision point, which 
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2016] PHILANTHROPY AND THE TEACHINGS OF THE CHURCH 2669 
presses toward a strong preference for both private finance and private 
delivery.  We need first to outline this approach, then critique it. 
 
False Dilemmas 
Consider, first, the question of financing philanthropy.  As a matter of 
principle, both secular and religious philanthropy tends to favor voluntary 
over coerced action, even if the coercion is rationally related to the common 
good.  But, as a matter of fact, voluntary financing of goods and services for 
the benefit of others (public goods for the enjoyment of all, or private goods 
gratuitously transferred to the needy) tends to fall short, on account of the 
well-theorized, and well-documented, “free rider problem.”144  People are 
likely to withhold paying their fair share, whatever that is, in the hope that 
someone else will step into the breach and pay it for them.  That poses the 
financing dilemma:  in principle, philanthropists find voluntary financing 
particularly praiseworthy; in practice, only coerced financing is adequate. 
Once we decide the question of finance, we face the question of delivery:  
Should the work of philanthropy actually be done by the state or by 
nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations?  In posing a dilemma over 
delivery, those who favor philanthropy first find a basic problem with the 
liberal state performing this function.  The liberal state, by the very fact that 
it is a government of laws, must operate under a system of rules; rules, by 
their very nature, undermine two basic philanthropic values.  The first is 
productive efficiency, getting the most “bang” for the “buck.”  The second, 
for want of a better word, is “warmth.”  State instrumentalities tend to get 
less bang for their buck, on this view, because they must operate under a 
regime of rules and attendant “red tape.”  On account of those same rules, 
state agencies cannot act spontaneously.  What’s more, lost in the red-tape 
along with administrative spontaneity is human warmth.  Bureaucracies are 
run by the bureaucratic; charities, by, presumably, the charitable. 
Why, then, not simply let the state finance private delivery?  Here is the 
second horn of the delivery dilemma.  At least to some extent, the liberal 
state’s financing of philanthropic activity must itself be limited by liberal 
standards, both substantive and procedural.  The liberal state obviously 
could not avoid the constitutional prohibition on establishing a church by 
the simple expedient of using tax revenues to finance third-sector churches.  
Perhaps a bit less obviously, the liberal state cannot avoid basic due process 
requirements like nondiscrimination and ends-means rationality by 
financing organizations that perform legitimate state functions by 
illegitimately discriminatory or irrationally ineffective means.  When 
private philanthropic organizations adopt state funds, accordingly, those 
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funds necessarily come with strings attached, strings that, upon closer 
inspection, may look a great deal like bureaucratic red tape.145 
One way to avoid the delivery dilemma is to go to the financing 
dilemma.  We can avoid the problems of red tape by opting for both private 
finance and private delivery.  Our best choice, then, would seem to be 
private financing of privately delivered philanthropy, like the Red Cross; 
our worst, state finance of state delivery, like FEMA.  State finance of 
private philanthropy is a distant second-best, because it involves both 
coercion and at least some measure of red tape in delivery; private financing 
of state philanthropy avoids the coercion of taxation, but at the expense of 
the full burden of bureaucracy in delivery. 
To clinch the double case for private finance and delivery, fans of private 
philanthropy sometimes suggest a third dilemma, the supposed “second-
order effects” of the first two.  Over time, public financing of philanthropy 
may well drive out private charitable contributions; goods and services 
delivered by a government agency need not be delivered by a private 
philanthropy.  The more accustomed people become to state finance and 
delivery, the more likely they are to feel they are normal and to find them 
acceptable.  This is the delivery dilemma:  even if the advantages of state 
finance or delivery seem to outweigh their disadvantages today, that choice 
will contribute to still more reliance on the state, coercive and inefficient as 
it is, in the long run.  Thus, the displacement dilemma presses us back to 
resolving the finance and the delivery dilemmas in favor of private 
philanthropy. 
 
Fair Balances 
Each of these dilemmas—the finance dilemma, the delivery dilemma, 
and the displacement dilemma—is either false or very much overstated.  To 
see why, we need to look more closely at each. 
Let’s begin again with the finance dilemma:  either lose the virtue of 
voluntary giving, or lose the levels of philanthropic funds that only the 
coercion of taxes can provide.  Notice, first, that if the amount of tax one is 
asked to pay is equal to, or less than, the amount that one reasonably 
believes one should pay, then the nature of coercion is significantly altered, 
at least for the conscientious.  They should feel that they are only made to 
do what, left to their own devices, they should do, and thus would do.  It 
would be, with a bow to Kant, as if their will on the matter had in fact been 
made a universal law.146 
Now notice, conversely, that any amount that conscientious citizens must 
pay above their fair share to make up for free riders is, ex hypothesi, unfair 
and thus amounts, in effect, to a surcharge on the virtue of willing donors.  
From that perspective, then, insisting on voluntary financing rather than 
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taxation seems to come doubly dear; on account of the free-rider problem, 
there will be less money for charity, and some of that money will come 
from generous donors having to pay more than their fair share.  Seen in that 
light, choosing to rely on voluntary finance looks a lot less like a way of 
promoting the virtue of generosity and a lot more like the vice of 
underserving the needy in order to subsidize the shirker.147  That, to say the 
least, is a very different dilemma:  one with a single horn, subsidizing the 
shirker. 
But haven’t we escaped the dilemma of finance, only to face, once again, 
the dilemma of delivery?  Tax dollars, as we saw before, can finance 
delivery of philanthropic goods and services by either the state itself or by 
private nonprofit organizations; either one will have to be more or less 
publicly accountable and thus more or less subject to the rules of the liberal 
state.  And that means red tape and cold bureaucracy.  Or does it?  On 
closer inspection, the arguments about bureaucratic red tape and official 
indifference both have a very different aspect. 
One person’s red tape, I’m not the first to remark, is another’s quality 
control.148  Many philanthropic activities—education and healthcare are 
nice examples—benefit from economies of scope and scale.  A large 
organization in any sector—private for-profit as well as private nonprofit or 
state—requires a certain level of administrative infrastructure—quite 
possibly the same level as its state counterpart.  The effect of reducing red 
tape may not be more spontaneity in meeting philanthropic goals, but more 
theft or waste of philanthropic assets. 
The bureaucratic critique of state philanthropy not only overlooks the 
bureaucracy in private philanthropy, it also misunderstands the nature of the 
law by which all bureaucracies properly operate.  The law of any 
sophisticated system, state or private, optimally incorporates not only “law” 
in the narrow sense, but also broad equitable “principles”—in today’s 
parlance, “standards” as well as “rules”—along with theories to guide 
which work better under difference circumstances.  The spirit can breathe 
life—and the letter, spell death—to any administrative regime, state or 
private. 
And spontaneity itself is not an unmixed blessing.  Spontaneous effusions 
of philanthropic funds, even philanthropic enterprises, often result in waste 
and worse—not only failing to make the needy better off, but actually 
worse off.  That kind of charity, to quote the title of a recent book on the 
subject, is toxic.149  Charity needs a head every bit as much as a heart; wise 
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heads leading warm hearts is well within both the Socratic and the 
Abrahamic traditions. 
Private philanthropy, finally, is not the only philanthropy with a heart.  
God, presumably, did not give Solomon the greatest wisdom to direct the 
House of David Philanthropic Foundation.150  The standard stump speech 
one-liner is this supposed oxymoron:  I’m from the government, and I’m 
here to help.151  Was that, one has to wonder, the feeling Captain Phillips 
had when Special Forces rescued him from Somali pirates?152  On a larger 
scale, is that the sentiment behind the tearful faces welcoming allied forces 
into liberated Paris?  When President Kennedy asked his fellow Americans 
to ask what they could do for their country, surely he meant for them to 
serve it and its neighbors, as he himself already had as both a naval war 
hero and peacetime Senator—ideally with a willing spirit and a helping 
hand—certainly without stinting or snarling.  His Peace Corps volunteers 
were not a more advanced level of the Boy and Girl Scouts; they were 
official goodwill ambassadors of the American Republic.153 
If the finance dilemma and the delivery dilemma can thus be diffused, 
what remains of their aggregation, the displacement dilemma?  Why is 
displacement, in either direction, bad in and of itself?  Once we have struck 
the right balance in addressing the questions of finance and delivery, why 
wouldn’t we want that balance to both remain in place and become 
acceptable until another needs to be struck?  Thus nothing remains, so far as 
I can see, except, perhaps, a suspicion of “big government” itself.  That, for 
good historical reasons, is a fear that both good liberals and good Catholics 
can share.  But that common fear cannot be the end of the matter. 
For one thing, the state, to defend the Republic today, must perforce the 
very large indeed; one suspects that individual liberty, including freedom of 
religion, has a good deal more to fear from a massive standing military than 
a merely sitting bureaucracy.  What’s more, the bureaucracy necessary for 
state philanthropy, unlike the military necessary for defense, can be diffused 
across the fifty states rather than concentrated at the federal level.  That, 
indeed, has always been the American tradition in the core matters of 
philanthropy:  both the minima of poverty relief and health care and the 
optima of higher education and the arts.  Any necessary redistribution of 
resources across states and coordination among states could continue to be 
done federally, but both those functions would require far less personnel 
than actual service delivery.  And state service delivery could not only calm 
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fears of centralized power, but also open opportunities for Brandeis’s 
laboratories of experimentation.154 
Beyond that, we must remember that the basic issue is not whether, in the 
abstract, to have bigger government, but whether, under realistic 
contemporary conditions, to have less government at the expense of more 
philanthropy.  Once again, it seems to me, Mill has found a position that 
can comfortably accommodate both his fellow liberals and their Catholic 
counterparts: 
It may be said generally, that anything which it is desirable should be 
done for the general interests of mankind or of future generations, or for 
the present interests of those members of the community who require 
external aid, but which is not of a nature to remunerate individuals or 
associations for undertaking it, is in itself a suitable thing to be undertaken 
by government:  though, before making the work their own, governments 
ought always to consider if there be any rational probability of its being 
done on what is called the voluntary principle, and if so, whether it is 
likely to be done in a better or more effectual manner by government 
agency, than by the zeal and liberality of individuals.155 
As one who leans further toward liberalism’s Far Left—perhaps even over 
the line into republicanism—I don’t particularly care for Mill’s insistence 
that state philanthropy be a matter of default, only after the other two 
sectors have failed.  But by far the most important point about Mill’s 
position—and the point he shares with Catholic Social Teaching—is this:  it 
is better for the work of philanthropy to be done by the state than for that 
work to left undone.156  And “better” here has to mean not only more just, 
in the tradition of Abrahamist faith and classical philosophy, but also more 
protective of basic liberties, in the tradition of Jeffersonian democracy.  It 
was Jefferson, after all, who noted that no people can long remain both 
ignorant and free.157  We must mean it, truly and sincerely, when we say:  
no child left behind.158 
All that said, we should finally note a very different and far deeper basis 
for anxiety about state power shared by both the Church and liberals like 
Mill:  distrust of democracy.  It was the popularly elected branches of our 
liberal state, we would do well to recall, that long made public education 
not only implicitly Protestant, but sometimes even explicitly anti-
Catholic;159 even as it has been the courts, the counter-majoritarian branch 
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of our liberal state, that has insisted that our public schools, like all agencies 
of our liberal state, be scrupulously neutral toward all religions.160  I have to 
imagine that both Mill and St. Thomas would share what the Federalists 
believed was the primary aim of all proper constitutions:  “to obtain for 
rulers men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, 
the common good of society.”161  The people’s voice may be a useful 
means both to find officials who know the common weal and to keep it 
their focus.  But no liberal and no Catholic can believe, any more than the 
Federalists, that the common weal is nothing more than the people’s will.  
Surely the deaths of both Socrates and Jesus have taught us, as it taught 
them, better than that. 
CONCLUSION:  
LABORING TOGETHER IN THE VINEYARD (WHICH IS THE 
LORD’S, SOME OF US BELIEVE AND NONE OF US NEED DENY) 
With a good conscience our only sure reward, with history the final judge 
of our deeds, let us go forth to lead the land we love, asking His blessing 
and His help, but knowing that here on earth God’s work must truly be 
our own. 
-John F. Kennedy162 
These concluding words from the inaugural address of the United 
States’s first Catholic President remind us that the common ground we are 
seeking has already been found.  Some of us, of course, expect a reward 
beyond good conscience from a final Judge far above human history.  If the 
rest of us have no reason to expect either His blessing or His help, neither 
have we any reason not to welcome both.  Either way, all of us who love 
the values our country has drawn from the classics and the Scriptures—
justice and peace, no less than liberty—can surely work together without 
fear that our Republic could ever become either too strong or too strongly 
philanthropic. 
The old, sad war between the Roman Catholic Church and liberalism 
need not, from the perspective of either, go on.  What’s more, for the sake 
of society’s most promising as well as its neediest, the darlings of both the 
Church and the liberal Left, that war must end.  And for their sake, that war 
must end, not in a truce, but in an alliance.  That alliance, thankfully, need 
not be merely tactical.  In forming a principled union between left-
liberalism and Orthodox Catholicism we have both the method and the 
materials that St. Thomas used to harmonize the prophets of Jerusalem and 
the philosophers of Athens. 
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That, at least, is where my analysis has led me.  That, I admit, may make 
me a little lonely among my fellow liberals who are leftist and my fellow 
scholars who are critical (not to mention my forebears who were Scottish 
Presbyterian and English Puritan).  That makes me rejoice all the more in 
the very good company of Catholics in the best of standing.  Unless I’m 
sadly mistaken, these include St. Thomas, Professor Aquinas, the very 
master of the mother Church’s magesterium; Pope Leo XIII, original voice 
of modern Catholic Social Teaching; and his current successor, Francis, 
properly proud product of the Society of Jesus.  I may, of course, be wrong; 
if you think I am, in their name—and in the name of both Socrates and 
Jesus—please help me see the error of my way. 
If I could, I would pray, Please, St. Thomas, intercede for us; if you can, 
I pray you, please do. 
